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RECENT BOOKS 
CENSORSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE. By Morris L. Ernst 
and Alan U. Schwartz. New York: Macmillan. 1964. Pp. xvi, 288. $6. 
Anxious to make legal thinking "intelligible to the laity," two 
seasoned and knowledgeable practitioners have here undertaken to 
survey for non-lawyers what they call the Law of the Obscene. Why 
they should have selected this area to exemplify jurisprudential 
wisdom is puzzling, for whatever the Law of the Obscene is con-
ceived to be, it hardly marks a moment of triumph for legal method. 
The common law of obscenity still awaits its Mansfield. Apart from 
a few memorable apothegms of Learned Hand, Curtis Bok, Jerome 
Frank, and a bare handful more, most censorship decisions are as 
dismal as the materials with which they deal. 
Apparently spawned from Charles Sedley's indecent exposure 
case in the reign of Charles II, obscenity law was in thrall for more 
than a century to Lord Justice Cockburn's omnivorous phrase in 
Regina v. Hicklin-"whether the tendency of the matter charged 
as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open 
to such immoral influence and into whose hands a publication of 
this sort may fall."1 The fragile contingencies, the headlong assump-
tions, the imprecision and subjectivity of this formulation were 
scarcely remarked as court after court found it serviceable weaponry 
for suppressing whatever was disapproved. Even during this century 
the decisions usually quibbled with details rather than the premises 
of the Hicklin rule. Only in the last decade have we been driven to 
search for the obscene among that which both attracts because it 
"appeals to the prurient interest" and repels because it is "patently 
offensive." 
It is apparent that few things so unsettle the judicial mind as 
the human reproductive system. In an obscenity prosecution, the 
judicial process seems to take on a peculiar sacerdotal quality. 
Though he may be the Rabelaisian wit of the bar convention, the 
judge who mounts the bench and confronts a photograph of a nude 
feels compelled to put a stop to unwed motherhood, juvenile crime, 
lavatory art, the sins of onanism, lowered church attendance, and a 
welter of similar problems. As a result, obscenity decisions have been 
marked by more than their fair share of ostrich gymnastics, boot-
strap ascents, tautologous pieties, and plain cant. It would seem 
better, as a mere matter of professional pride, to hide all this as a 
trade secret rather than to expose it to a heathen multitude. Messrs. 
Ernst and Schwartz, however, are nothing daunted. 
That the story is fascinating is undeniable. The authors have 
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here retold pithily and with dash the tribulations of such official 
martyrs to suppression as Mademoiselle de Maupin, Ulysses, Lady 
Chatterley, and Fanny Hill. The authors recall the battles over the 
Well of Loneliness, The Sex Side of Life, Married Love, and many 
more. They rehearse the United States Supreme Court decisions 
from Doubleday to Butler, through Roth to the last Bantam Books 
case, in sufficient detail to give even the most unsophisticated reader 
an understanding of how the Constitution got into the dirty book 
business. While some favorite cases are omitted and others barely 
mentioned, this is a representative, readable, and illuminating se-
lection. The book variously excerpts judicial utterances, editorializes 
about clusters of decisions, paraphrases or quotes other commen-
tators, and even exhibits in full the throes of the Maryland Supreme 
Court in deciding how hard "hard core pornography" must be. 
In a kaleidoscopic survey of what the cases hold, the authors 
cannot pause for long over the hard questions. Do we suppress a 
book because an unfl.ustered judge can really competently predict 
that it will fluster someone else, or is this only another decorous 
"fable agreed upon"? Consistent with freedom of expression and 
individual liberties, does contemporary society really have a right to 
preserve us from copulatory incitements, whether pictures or per-
fumes? Is there a meaningful link between revery, however lush or 
lurid, and overt conduct which can rationally be regarded as anti-
social? How many undeniable outrages in our society do we obscure 
by seizing upon the smut-peddler as public scapegoat? What are the 
individual and social uses of the unrepressed sexual imagination as 
well as its dangers? Neither this book nor the decisions it reviews 
provide many helpful answers. 
The question whether a writing is obscene, a New York jurist 
of a generation ago is quoted as declaring, "is one of the plainest 
that can be presented to a jury, and under the guidance of a discreet 
judge there is little danger of their reaching a wrong decision."2 
The recent varied fortunes of Tropic of Cancer in many jurisdic-
tions purporting to apply the same rule of federal constitutional 
law suggest that the problem has never been so simple. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court, since Roth, has been having a harder time explain-
ing the results it plainly wishes to reach. And even when the Justices 
are in agreement, experience suggests that it takes a good deal more 
than their opinion to restrict the self-assured excesses of the lower 
courts. In the last decade, as the Court has sought to curb the 
censor's zeal, trial judges have often penalized transgressions of the 
national moral law of obscenity with a voracity which might have 
made Torquemada blush. With few exceptions in recent years, the 
2. Andrews, J., in People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 412 (App. Div. 1884). 
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appellate chore in censorship cases is to disinfect what trial judges 
close to "community morality" persist in doing. 
Though there are warnings to the contrary in this volume, its 
very design tends to suggest that the law of obscenity has shown 
a long, steady march upward and onward, with true principles grad-
ually honed, refined, and made more rational with each succeeding 
decision. Unfortunately, it isn't so. Having rejected in 1957 the thesis 
that disturbing thoughts about sex should be measured by basically 
the same standards as are used to measure disturbing thoughts about 
sedition or riots, the Supreme Court is still struggling to discover 
acceptable criteria of the obscene and to apply them to various 
media and diverse circumstances. Other courts are following behind 
at varying paces. Even if this volume makes the Law of Obscenity 
intelligible to laymen, it is likely to take years (and more volumes) 
to make it intelligible to lawyers. 
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